The Arab Role

by Amir Taheri
National Review Online
December 20, 2002

This item is available on the Benador Associates website, at http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/176

With the future of Iraq in balance, the Middle East may be heading for the biggest change it has experienced since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire eight decades ago.

The first change was brought about by the intervention of a major outside power, Great Britain, later joined by France in redrawing the map of the region.

The second change, now taking shape, will see the United States as catalyst. As always, history does not repeat itself in the same way.

During the first change, Turkey was cast in the role of the loser. This time Turkey intends to be on the winning side by giving the United States, its NATO ally, discreet but highly appreciated support.

Iran, an observer in the first change, which concerned the Turks and their Arab and Kurdish subjects, may, this time, be dragged into a process beyond its control.

Russia had been knocked out of the first process of regional change by its revolutionary turmoil. This time it is likely to be out as a result of economic and military weakness.

There is another difference between then and now.

In 1918, when the Arab revolt , led by Colonel T. E. Lawrence, began, there was no Jewish state in the Middle East. Today, Israel sits right in the heart of the Middle East as the region's strongest power. But the most important difference between then and now concerns the Arabs.

In 1918 the Arabs, rejecting the idea of Islamic solidarity under the Ottomans, opted for the Western idea of nationalism, and joined the British to administer the coup de grace to the moribund caliphate of Constantinople. They ended up winning, not the independence they had dreamed of, but two new colonial masters.

Nevertheless, the idea of a distinct Arab identity was established, and, in time, led to the emergence of almost two-dozen Arab, and self-styled Arab, states.

This time, however, the Arabs seem to have been reduced to the position of spectators.

Some hope that change would remain limited to Iraq.

Incredibly, a few have also managed to delude themselves that this whole thing is a summer cloud that would soon dissipate, leaving everyone, including Saddam Hussein, in their places.

Pro-active in the events of the 1918, the Arabs this time seem content to react to whatever happens, largely through meaningless pseudo-diplomatic utterances.

The question is: What could the Arabs do?

The answer is: plenty.

For start they could acknowledge that Saddam Hussein's regime is a problem not only for the people of Iraq but also for the entire region.

Of course, some professional Arab-bashers might use such an assertion to claim that other Arab regimes are no better than that of Saddam.

But the truth is that Saddam's regime is way beyond the pale. No Arab regime in history has had such a black record of violence. Nor has any been as corrupt, and as cynical.

The Arab rulers are certainly no choir boys. But even the worst of the present Arab regimes is better than the system created by Saddam Hussein.

The Arabs should have banished the Iraqi regime on the grounds that it was a disgrace to all Arabs.

Thus the idea of regime change in Iraq would have become an Arab idea, rather than an American one. And that would have given the Arabs a major role in deciding the future shape of the region.

Had the Arabs agreed to collectively banish Saddam Hussein, it would have been more difficult for him to pursue his game of deceit and provocation. An opportunity would have arisen to persuade a totally isolated Saddam to bow out and spare Iraq another war.

At the same time an active Arab policy on Iraq would have made it more difficult for the United States to do as it pleases. The American public would have listened to a serious Arab alternative to deal with the Iraqi issue through means other than a straight war.

In the 1991 campaign to liberate Kuwait, the U.S. had to listen to its Arab allies. This time it has no such obligation.

An active Arab policy might have provided the backbone of a broader international effort in which Russia, China, the Europeans, and the remnants of the non-aligned movement might have joined in a bid to ensure the desired transition in Baghdad.

Amr Mussa, the Arab League secretary-general, says that no Arab sate can take part in military action against another Arab state.

The secretary-general needs to revise his history lessons. The Arab states have fought no fewer than 15 open or secret wars against one another since the 1930s, including the not very peaceful rape of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990.

The real world is not divided between Arab and non-Arab. It is divided between right and wrong. The Arabs must unequivocally reject Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein as enemies of their people.

It was interesting that some40 countries, including Iran and Turkey, had observers at the conference of Iraqi opposition parties in London this week while the Arab states boycotted it. It is as if those Iraqis who met in London were not Arabs or that the Iraq they wish to create should have no place in the Arab family.

The Arab absence encourages Saddam to be defiant, while imposing no restraints on Washington.
Paradoxically, the Arab policy, or lack of it, has made war more, and not less, likely.

Arab policymakers know that if, or shall we now say when, there is war, Saddam is unlikely to emerge victorious.

Their hope is that the United States will then invite them to take their places at the banquet. This is especially true of the 11 Arab states that, while opposing the use of force in words, are supporting the U.S. in deeds.

That is an illusion. No victor in history ever threw a morsel to those who did not offer support when it counted.

Tehran has understood this. This is why it hosted a summit of the three main Iraqi opposition leaders earlier this month and supported the conference of Iraqi opposition leaders in London.

The first change in the region led to Pax Britannica that, in one form or another, lasted until the 1970s.

The second could lead to Pax Americana.

And that could be bad both for the Arabs and for the United States.

The U.S. is not a typical imperial power, and is effective as peacekeeper if it has strong regional allies, as was the case in Western Europe throughout the Cold War.

At least some of the Arab states might have provided the kind of alliance needed to ensure a smooth transition in the region. They seem to have decided not to do so. History will show whether they took the right path.


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